Anti-Spinoza, written by the theology professor at Leiden University and promoter of Cartesian philosophy, Christoph Wittich, is one of the earliest and most detailed critiques of Spinoza's Ethics. Published in 1690, it is both a criticism of the Ethics and, by way of favourable comparison, a piece of advocacy for a Cartesian method in philosophy. Christiane Hubert describes AntiSpinoza as a work "intended no doubt to become a sort of teaching manual -precise, meticulous, exhaustive".
very different from those used by Descartes in the Meditations. Wittich's attempt to draw a sharp and salutary distinction between the methods of Spinoza and Descartes is, to this extent, a failure.
Analytic vs. synthetic method Anti-Spinoza opens with a general discussion of philosophical method, beginning with a distinction between analytic and synthetic method -the latter being, we are told, the one employed by Spinoza in the Ethics. 4 The opening passage is a very close paraphrase of a section of Descartes's replies to the objections posed by Marin Mersenne to the Meditations (the Second Replies). 5 I shall begin with a discussion of the latter, which helps to highlight a point that becomes important for Wittich.
In his objections, Mersenne asks Descartes why, in the Meditations, he did not treat his subject "in geometrical order", the order he employed so effectively in his mathematical studies. 6 Descartes replies that "the geometrical manner of writing" involves two things -order (ordo) and method (ratio). Order is the requirement that: [T] he items which are put forward first must be known entirely without the aid of what comes later; and the remaining items must be arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone before. 7 Descartes asserts that he did follow order in the Meditations. But as far as the method of demonstration goes, there are two kinds: the analytic and the synthetic. In the Meditations, he asserts, he favoured the analytic method. Analytic method, he explains: […] shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was discovered methodically and as it were a priori [tanquam a priori], so that if the reader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention to all points, he will make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had discovered it for himself. 8 Synthetic method, meanwhile:
[…] demonstrates the conclusion clearly and employs a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms, theorems, and problems, so that if anyone denies one of the conclusions it can be shown at once that it is contained in what has gone before. 9 Descartes adds that synthetic method proceeds "as it were, a posteriori [tanquam a posteriori] (though the proof itself is often more a priori than it is in the analytic method)". 10 It is not obvious what Descartes means by the terms a priori and a posteriori here. John Cottingham's footnote to the translation of this passage notes that Descartes's use of the term a priori in his discussion of analytic method: […] seems to correspond neither with the post-Leibnizian sense (where a priori truths are those which are known independently of experience), nor with the medieval, Thomist sense (where a priori reasoning is that which proceeds from cause to effect). What Descartes may mean when he says that analysis proceeds "as it were a priori (tanquam a priori)" is that it starts from what is epistemically prior, i.e. from what is prior in the "order of discovery" followed by the meditator. 11 However, when Descartes makes the point about synthetic method quoted above, Cottingham speculates that:
[…] Descartes may mean that though the proofs involved are a priori (viz., in the traditional, Thomist sense), the method of synthesis starts from premisses which are epistemically posterior -i.e., which are arrived at later in the order of discovery. 12 Cottingham has a strong rationale for suspecting that when Descartes speaks of methods proceeding "as it were" a priori and a posteriori he cannot mean a priori/posteriori in the post-Leibnizian or the Thomistic sense. To claim that Descartes means a priori/posteriori in the post-Leibnizian sense would be historically absurd. As for the Thomistic sense, the relevant criterion, according to Descartes, for demarcating a demonstration as tanquam a priori or tanquam a posteriori is whether or not it follows the order of discovery. This at least prima facie, seems independent of the criterion for judging whether or not a demonstration is a priori or a posteriori in the Thomistic sense, namely whether or not it proceeds from cause to effect. In fact, I would generalize Cottingham's explanation and say that a priori reasoning in the Thomistic sense proceeds from whatever is the real reason for something to whatever it is the real reason for. 13 The term "cause" is often used in this very broad sense to mean simply the reason for things being the way they are, as in fact Wittich points out at a certain point. 14 This, however, means that Cottingham's explanation of the order of discovery as beginning with what is "epistemically prior" creates a certain ambiguity by the use of the latter modern term. Anybody who had any formal training in philosophy in the seventeenth century -and this certainly includes both Descartes and Wittich -would presumably be aware of the Aristotelian distinction between things that are better known by us and those that are "better known by nature" (γνωριμωτέρων wύσει). The distinction is made, for instance, near the beginning of the Physics. 15 Things better known by us are those whose concepts are most familiar to us, or those whose concepts we are capable of forming first. Things better known by nature are those that are the real reasons for whatever they are invoked to explain. Does "epistemically prior" mean better known by us or better known by nature? If it means the latter, then the order of epistemic priority, that is, the order of discovery, may well be the same as the order of causation (or explanation) in the Thomistic sense.
Descartes's proposal that demonstrations following the order of discovery allow the reader to know things as though she is discovering them for herself suggests that such demonstrations begin with what is best known to us. Moreover, when Descartes prepares a synthetic presentation of the Meditations at Mersenne's request, the definitions and axioms with which he begins involve many concepts that appear to be explanatorily fundamental but are also highly abstract and unfamiliar to an unprepared reader, such as "objective reality", "formal and eminent existence" and so on. Such concepts may be best known by nature but are certainly not best known by us. Thus Descartes seems to be implying that the key criterion distinguishing a demonstration tanquam a priori from one tanquam a posteriori is whether or not it begins with what is best known by us. Thus the distinction is different from that between a priori and a posteriori demonstrations in the Thomistic sense. As for his comment that synthetic demonstrations are often more a priori than analytic ones, clearly "a priori" cannot here mean the same as "tanquam a priori" earlier, and Cottingham's proposal that here Descartes is at this point using "a priori" in the Thomistic sense, to refer to reasoning that proceeds from cause to effect, is highly plausible.
An examination of Descartes's geometrical presentation and some of his other comments in the Second Replies suggests a certain interpretation of what he means. Earlier in these replies, while elaborating the cogito argument, he points out that when somebody infers his own existence from the fact that he is thinking, he is not reasoning by way of any syllogism. If he were reasoning syllogistically, he would need to know the major premise: "Everything which thinks is, or exists." 16 But, Descartes explains, such a person in fact arrives at his conclusion "from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing". Descartes goes on: "It is in the nature of our mind to construct general propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones." 17 Thus, when Descartes presented the cogito analytically in the Meditations, he began with a first-person account of his own intuition about his own particular case, and not with the general proposition that everything that thinks exists. When he later presents his reasoning synthetically, however, he begins with general propositions, for instance the proposition that "a real attribute (e.g. thought) cannot belong to nothing". 18 Here then, perhaps, is the reason for Descartes's belief that synthetic demonstrations are tanquam a posteriori: they do not follow the order of discovery because they begin from general propositions and derive particular ones from these, whereas "it is the nature of our mind to construct general propositions from particular ones". On the other hand, synthetic demonstrations may often be more a priori than analytic ones, since general propositions are often the real explanations for particular ones. For instance: I may learn that thinking entails existing first in my own case and later in the general sense, but the general rule explains my particular case and not the other way around.
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The reason this is important here is that Wittich seems to suppose that the analytic method is more a priori than the synthetic, not simply tanquam a priori. Close as his discussion of analytic and synthetic method is to that of Descartes, it diverges from its model in claiming that the analytic method "follows the order of nature accurately, proving nothing except by the true causes and true principles of things", 20 whereas:
The synthetic method often deviates from the order of nature, supposing it to be unnecessary to order propositions and demonstrations in the way it would have to if it followed that order; thus things are often demonstrated in quite difficult ways, not as things are really discovered, but rather by farfetched, forced, and artificially contrived and structured means, of which many examples can be found in Euclid.
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To say that only the analytic method always follows the order of nature, that is, the order of "the true causes and true principles of things" is, in effect, to say that only the former always proceeds a priori in the Thomistic sense. 22 This does not accord with Descartes's own views, at least as I have interpreted them. For him, as we have seen, the synthetic method is often more a priori than the analytic, since it deduces particular propositions from general ones, which often means that it follows the order of real explanatory priority, though not the order of discovery. Does Wittich, then, reject Descartes's view that general propositions are often prior to particular ones? Yet who could seriously deny that the order of explanation often runs from propositions like "everything that thinks exists" to propositions like "if I think then I exist"? 23 One need not make such a radical proposal about Wittich as long as one gives due weight to an explanation he later gives of why synthetic method diverges from the order of nature. This explanation makes specific reference to second notions. I turn to it now.
Spinoza's key terms as second notions
At the beginning of the main part of Anti-Spinoza, Wittich again refers to the order of nature, this time while criticizing Spinoza's methodological choice to begin with a consideration of second notions. "If we are to follow the order of nature", he insists "second notions cannot be examined before primary notions." 24 As examples of second notions, Wittich gives "substance", "essence", "subject", "attribute", "mode", "cause" and "effect".
25 Second notions, he claims:
[…] are simply general ways of considering things…. They do not fall under the common notions and intellect of men, but rather are invented by philosophers who establish a collection of really existing things, or of things which exist only in thought or as sensory appearances, to be compared amongst each other.
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This vague description does little to explain precisely what Wittich means by "second notions". Verbeek aims to explain this further by tracing the origins of the term to Zabarella and the nominalist tradition in Scholastic philosophy. 27 Verbeek quotes Zabarella:
[…] first notions are names [nomina] which immediately signify things by means of a concept of the mind, like "animal" and "man", that is, the very concepts of which those names are signs; second notions are other names imposed upon the first, like "genus", "species", "name", "verb", "proposition", "syllogism", and so on, or rather on the concepts signified by those (first) names.
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Second notions are, Verbeek suggests, "the elements of what we would call a 'meta-language'".
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Like Wittich in the above quotation, Zabarella claims that "second notions are our own work and fictions of our minds." 30 Verbeek's exegesis of Zabaralla continues:
[…] since logic deals with second notions only, there is no good reason why it should be called a science, given the fact that "science relates only to things that are necessary". Dealing with man made things logic is more like an art or technique. It is not knowledge of things although it helps us to produce knowledge of things.
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What Verbeek seems to mean in saying that second notions are elements of meta-language is that they refer to our ways of conceiving of things rather than to things themselves. To designate a word by the meta-linguistic term "verb" is to define the way in which that word is used by competent speakers of the language; likewise, to designate an idea by a second notion is to define the conceptual role that that idea plays within a certain scheme. The reason that logic is said by Zabarella not to be a science relating to "things that are necessary" is, presumably, that how we choose to conceive of things is up to us, whereas the way that things are outside of our intellects are is not up to us and is "necessary" in this sense. One consequence of this is that logical propositions, which contain second notions, cannot by themselves support any conclusions about how things are, independently of our ways of conceiving of things. This is for the simple reason that such propositions merely describe our ways of conceiving. The proposition, for example, that every species subsists within a genus does not tell us anything about the things thus classified, except that they are thus classified.
Wittich's claim that synthetic demonstrations reject the order of nature is therefore likely to be based upon the belief that such demonstrations begin with the application of second notions. Most would agree that it is things being the way they are that (at least partly) causes us to conceive of them in certain ways, certainly not our conceiving of them in certain ways that causes them to be the way they are. To affirm the latter would be to deny the order of nature, taking the effect for the cause or the explanandum for the explanans. But to begin a demonstration with a consideration of second notions is to risk implying that our ways of conceiving of things are explanatorily fundamental, thus denying the order of nature. For this reason Wittich claims that:
[…] if Spinoza had wanted to proceed distinctly and in an orderly fashion, he should have first considered those things which fall under the common intellect -God, Mind, etc. -and only after observing their real attributes formed the various second notions -Cause, Substance, etc.
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It appears, then, that Wittich's basic methodological critique of the Ethics is that Spinoza reverses the order of nature by concluding facts about how things are from facts about how they are conceived of, the latter expressed in second notions.
This helps, for instance, to explain Wittich's response to proposition 5 of Part 1 of the Ethics, which states that "in nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute." Wittich points out that:
This proposition is false if "of the same nature or attribute" is understood to refer to specific identity rather than numerical identity.
[…] To it I respond, that two substances could be distinguished by the diversity of their individual attributes, which may be considered as affections or modes of the substances as generally conceived. Thus the minds of Peter and Paul [are distinguished], likewise two bodies.
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Yet Spinoza seems to have pre-empted this response by claiming that "substance is prior in nature to its affections [so that] if the affections are put to one side and [the substance] is considered in itself […] one cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another." 34 An explanation of why Wittich is unmoved by this argument is that he interprets the proposition "substance is prior in nature to its affections", as merely describing how we conceive of things, with "substance" and "affections" as second notions. It may mean, for instance, that we predicate affections of substances and not the other way around. Such a proposition cannot entail any fact about the real identity conditions of things outside of our intellect, for no such fact could follow simply from how we conceive of things.
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A clearer example of the same line of thinking is found in Wittich's objection to proposition 7, Part 1, which states that "it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist." Wittich reads this as expressing the standard view that a substance is by definition something that exists per se, and comments as follows:
When … a substance is said to be in itself and by itself, this is understood to be in thought -in the intellect. That is, we understand a substance to be this way, but it cannot be determined by our having this concept of it that it exists. Likewise if we say a whole is that which is composed of all its parts, this does not allow us to infer that therefore the whole exists, since while it shows us what a whole is, this is understood to mean how it is in our intellect, that is, how a whole exists in our intellect. Likewise, however much we truly have a clear and distinct idea of what substance is like, we cannot thereby say that a substance exists in that way. If we have a clear and distinct idea of an Angel -that which is a mind separated from a body -we are not from this idea allowed to conclude that an Angel exists in such a way.
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In other words, the assertion that something is a substance does not concern the thing itself; it concerns how the thing is "in our intellect", that is, how we conceive of it. To say that something is a substance is to say that we conceive of it as existing per se, just as to call something a whole is to assert that we conceive of it as something composed of its parts, or to call something an angel is to claim that we believe it to be a mind separated from a body. But to conceive of things thusly does not make them so. This is important because Spinoza's first proof of God's existence, the demonstration for proposition 11, Part 1, depends almost entirely on proposition 7, Part 1. It states, in effect, that since God is a substance, and since it pertains to the nature of substance to exist, God must exist. For Wittich, this must be the wrong way around: to say that God is a substance is to say that we consider him to exist per se; one reason for this is, presumably, that he does exist per se. But certainly our considering him to exist in that way is not the reason for him doing so. Thus Spinoza's proof takes the effect for the cause.
Wittich's objection would not hold if Spinoza's claim were that a substance is something that does exist per se, or, as Spinoza puts it, something to whose nature existence pertains, rather than simply something that we consider to be per se. The proof for proposition 11 would then be, roughly, that since God is something to whose nature existence pertains, he must exist necessarily. Such a proof has many problems, apparent circularity not least among them, but it is not subject to Wittich's critique. 37 For it draws its inference from something that is true about God, not from something that is conceived of God. When, in the Fifth Meditation, Descartes proves God's necessary existence from the inconceivability of his nonexistence, he goes on:
It is not that my thought makes it so, or imposes any necessity on the thing itself; on the contrary, it is the necessity of the thing itself, namely the existence of God, which determines my thinking in this respect. 38 If Spinoza is not using "substance" as a second notion, there is no reason he would not be entitled to say the same thing. Here I diverge from Verbeek, who construes Wittich's critique as follows:
[…] by simply reflecting on the notion of substance one cannot legitimately claim that a substance exists because the notion of substance implies necessary existence. 39 This is, it seems to me, a less charitable way of interpreting Wittich's argument. Certainly one cannot conclude "by reflecting on the notion of substance" that a substance exists. But Spinoza does not attempt any such inference. He draws his conclusion partly from the consideration that God is a substance, which is to say that he reflects not only on the notion of substance but also on the notion of God. Wittich, who has clearly read the Ethics with great care, is surely aware of this. Moreover, Verbeek's way of construing the argument does not require it to depend on the view that "substance" is a second notion. Even if "substance" means "thing existing per se" rather than "thing conceived of as existing per se", it would remain the case that simply reflecting on this definition could not prove the existence of any substance. No ontological conclusions can be drawn from a mere definition. If this were all Wittich meant, it would not explain why he emphasizes the fact that the definitions of "substance" and "whole", and the clear and distinct idea of an angel, express only how such objects exist "in our intellect". This is to say that such ideas express how we conceive of things; it is not to say that such ideas describe how things must be if they do as a definition would do. For only the first statement concerns our intellect; the second concerns what is possible, irrespective of our intellect.
Indeed, Verbeek might not really disagree with my construal of Wittich's argument, since he claims that "[a]ll Wittich's arguments -those at any rate which I have discussed -can be reduced to an argument about the difference between first notions and second notions." 40 This will be true if Wittich's argument is what I construe it as: because "substance" is a second notion, to call God a substance is simply to say that he is conceived of in a certain way, and no fact about God (including the fact of his existence) could follow from a mere conception in our intellect.
My construal also explains why, as Verbeek notes, Wittich believes that synthetic demonstrations aim at "persuasion rather than illumination". 41 While the fact that I conceive of something as being a certain way certainly does not explain its being that way, somebody hoping to persuade me that it is really thus could do well to show how this is entailed by my own conceptions. For instance, if I conceive of God as a being per se, and if I can be shown that it follows from this that God exists necessarily, somebody could use a synthetic demonstration based on the fact that God is a substance (in Wittich's second-notion sense of "substance") to convince me that God exists necessarily. Such a demonstration would not really prove anything. It would draw out the implications of my own conceptions without showing them to be correct. But it would admirably serve the purpose of "persuasion rather than illumination". This may be what Wittich means when he says that, since the synthetic method does not follow the order of nature in the way the analytic method does, demonstrationes ad absurdum appear frequently in the former but not in the latter. For, Wittich proposes, "such [demonstrations] can convince a mind, but do not bring any clarity." 42 Demonstrationes ad absurdum, that is to say, may reveal what one must concede in order to hold consistent beliefs, but do not in themselves show what is really the case.
Even as pieces of persuasion, however, synthetic demonstrations based on second notions will only work if the target of the persuasion agrees to conceive of things in the manner described by the second notions. Wittich believes that Spinoza's proofs do not even meet this standard. Spinoza himself, Wittich argues, distinguishes between a true definition referring to a real object and a definition that merely expresses how a certain term is understood. This, Wittich says, corresponds to "the distinction that others make between real definitions and nominal definitions". 43 Definitions in terms of second notions can only be nominal. But people would not generally agree with many of Spinoza's definitions. 44 Thus his synthetic demonstrations, though they would in any case not constitute genuine proofs, cannot even serve the purposes of persuasion.
I shall now endeavour to show that Spinoza's key terms do not, in fact, refer to second notions, and that Wittich's objections are therefore misdirected.
Spinoza's key terms as common notions
Spinoza is, perhaps, not sufficiently careful to avoid giving the impression that "substance", as he defines it, is a second notion. The definition he gives is: "By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing from which it must be formed." 45 In stating that a substance is not only something conceived through itself but also what is in itself, he seems to be blocking Wittich's reading of "substance" as a second notion. But as he elaborates on this, he returns to speaking only about the way things are conceived, again inviting the reading that "substance" is a second notion. 46 Nevertheless, the damage that this reading does to his central proofs is enough to make it questionable, simply as a matter of interpretative charity.
The issue is, however, made more complex by the fact that Spinoza excuses himself in the Ethics from discussing "those notions they call Second", since he has "set these aside for another treatise, and [does] not wish to give rise to disgust by too long a discussion". 47 There is no record that this other treatise was ever written. Nevertheless, this statement in itself tells us something. It seems improbable that Spinoza would find a discussion of second notions peripheral to the Ethics if his crucial demonstrations were really based upon them. Moreover, at the same place, he lists second notions and "the axioms founded on them" alongside "other things I have thought about from time to time [et alia, quae circa haec aliquando meditatus sum]". It would be somewhat odd to speak of issues of direct importance to the argument one is currently constructing as "things I have thought about from time to time".
What makes the matter even more confusing is that Spinoza goes on, "in order not to omit anything that it is necessary to know", to discuss what he calls "Transcendental terms" and "Universal terms", leaving open the possibility that he regards these as species of second notions. This would mean he understands the latter very differently from Wittich, since it is clear that he regards transcendental and universal terms as terms referring to universals -classes of things (albeit rather vaguely defined) -rather than to ways of conceiving of things. It is also highly unlikely that he would deliberately base his reasoning on these ideas, since he regards them as the product of confusion. It is possible, then, that Spinoza and Wittich define 'second notions' differently, and that second notions in Wittich's sense are in fact the foundations of Spinoza's reasoning. There is, however, as I shall now endeavour to show, a more plausible candidate for what Spinoza takes his key terms such as "substance", "attribute" and "mode" to refer to namely what he calls "common notions".
In explaining these, Spinoza asserts, first, that "[t]hose things which are common to all things, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately", 48 and next that:
[I]f something is common to, and peculiar [proprium] to, the human body and certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected, and is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will also be adequate in the mind. 49 Spinoza goes on to assert that "[w]hatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind are also adequate." 50 He concludes: "With this I have explained the cause of those notions which are called common, and which are the foundations of our reasoning." 51 This implies that ideas of whatever is common to all bodies, or peculiar to the human body and the external bodies by which it is usually affected, and whatever ideas are formed by seeing what follows from such ideas are all common notions. It also implies that such ideas, being "the foundations of our reasoning", are the basis of the demonstrations in the Ethics; that is at least a plausible way of understanding what Spinoza means by "our reasoning". It is likely, therefore, that "substance", "attribute" and so on are common notions for Spinoza. I shall now elaborate this point.
Clearly one example of a common notion is the idea of God's essence. The idea of this can only be adequate, Spinoza explains, because "[e]ach idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God." 52 Thus "what gives knowledge of an eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole." 53 It fits the definition of a common notion, and therefore must be adequate for Spinoza.
By the same reasoning, however, "substance", "attribute" and "mode" are likely to be the objects of common notions. It is a common feature of all bodies that they are modes of the attributes of a single substance. 54 If God is the object of a common notion because every singular thing involves an eternal and infinite essence of God, the same must surely be said of God's attributes, since, Spinoza says, the ideas of singular things "must involve the concept of their attribute". 55 If we can form a common notion of God's essence, we must likewise be able to form a common notion of God's attributes; an attribute, after all, is simply "what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence." 56 But it is difficult to imagine forming an adequate idea of God's attributes without knowing what an attribute is, that is, having an adequate idea of "attribute" in general. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine forming an adequate idea of God's essence without having an adequate idea of both "substance" and "essence". A substance, after all, is what God is; an essence is what his essence is.
By parity of reasoning, since all singular things are alike in being modes, the property of being a mode is also something "peculiar to the human body and certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected", and will also therefore be the object of a common notion. Likewise, the ideas of cause and effect can be common notions, since Spinoza believes that it is a universal property of all bodies that, as finite modes, they have a cause, and that they cause other thingsthat is, they all possess both the property of being a cause and the property of being an effect. 57 The supposition that such ideas are common notions provides an attractive alternative to Wittich's view that they are second notions. Rather than referring to our ways of conceiving of things, such terms might refer to things of particular kinds, or to the properties that define the kinds of things they are. "Substance", for example, might be the idea of a thing to whom existence pertains, or of the property of being such a thing, rather than the idea of our way of conceiving of certain things. This is likely to be what Spinoza believes, since he regards common notions as the foundations of our reasoning. Given the presence of this alternative hypothesis, one that renders Spinoza's arguments a great deal more consistent, plausible and intelligible, there seems no motivation to persevere with Wittich's hypothesis that Spinoza's reasoning is grounded on second notions. Wittich is simply wrong to suppose that Spinoza's key terms refer to concepts that "do not fall under the common notions and intellect of men". 58 
Conclusion
I have proposed an interpretation of Wittich's methodological argument against Spinoza, running roughly as follows: Synthetic demonstrations in metaphysics tend to violate the order of nature because they begin with the definitions of second notions. Since second notions describe our ways of conceiving things, placing them at the start of a demonstration invites the reader to suppose that our ways of conceiving of things explain how things are in themselves, rather than the other way around. Such demonstrations may be persuasive, but they are invalid as genuine proofs. All Spinoza's key metaphysical propositions are demonstrated in this invalid way (and they fail even at persuasion).
Since Spinoza's key terms -"substance", "attribute", "mode", "cause", "essence" and so onrefer to common notions rather than second notions, Wittich's argument misses its target. To return to an earlier example, Spinoza's proof of God's existence, based on the fact that God is a substance, is not vulnerable to Wittich's critique if "substance" is taken to refer to a common notion meaning "thing per se", rather than to a second notion meaning "thing conceived of as being per se". The inference that God exists necessarily because he is a substance does not reverse the order of nature by deducing a fact about an object outside the intellect from a fact about the way we conceive of it.
As I mentioned, there are problems with this proof even when it is interpreted rightly. Since the proposition that God is a substance (in what I take to be Spinoza's sense of "substance") seems to be very nearly equivalent to the proposition that God exists necessarily, the proof appears to be circular, using its conclusion as a premise. Nevertheless, it does not seem worlds away from Descartes's proof in the Fifth Meditation. Descartes, as I mentioned, argues that although his proof of God's existence infers that God necessarily exists from the fact that one cannot conceive of God not existing, this fact about conceivability is not given as the reason for God's necessary existence, rather the converse:
It is not that my thought makes it so, or imposes any necessity of the thing itself; on the contrary, it is the necessity of the thing itself, namely the existence of God, which determines my thinking in this respect. 59 Conceivability is determined by possibility and is therefore a guide to possibility. It does not determine possibility. Likewise, Spinoza's first proof at proposition 11, Part 1, explains the fact that God cannot be conceived of except as existing by the fact that God is a substance -a thing to whose nature existence pertains. He invites the reader to suppose that God does not exist, then shows that because God is a substance, such a supposition leads to absurdity: the necessity of God's existence determines the absurdity rather than the absurdity determining the necessity. What Spinoza does not give is an argument for the claim that God is a substance, that is, that definition 6 of Part 1 is correct. But, as we have seen, Spinoza believes that we necessarily possess an adequate idea of God; thus, because our idea of God is an idea of a substance, and we know that this idea is adequate, we perhaps have the required premise. Similarly in the Fifth Meditation we are assumed at the beginning of the proof to know by a clear and distinct idea that God is an entia summe perfecti. 60 This is where circularity appears in both proofs: Descartes, arguably, cannot assume the truth of all clear and distinct ideas without assuming the existence of God, while Spinoza's proposition that the human mind necessarily forms an adequate idea of God arguably depends for its demonstration upon the presumed truth of a metaphysical theory in which God plays a central role. 61 These are all topics for further discussion. But the parallel is clear enough to suggest that, minus the unfounded assumption that Spinoza's key terms refer to second notions, Spinoza's reasoning and that of Wittich's favoured philosopher are not wildly dissimilar. According to Verbeek, Wittich's "critique of Spinoza helps us to neutralize the unfruitful and uninteresting textbook idea of Spinoza as being in some way a 'radical Cartesian'". 62 If Wittich's analysis of the Ethics were correct, Spinoza would be committed to a methodological mistake that Descartes seems to avoid, and this would provide a good reason to reject the characterization of Spinoza as a Cartesian. But as things stand, the issue is rather less clear. There may be many things wrong with what Verbeek calls the textbook idea of Spinoza, but the objection following from Wittich's methodological critique cannot be one of them.
Notes the latter (along with others of the same kind) explains the former. The difference is that in the first case the latter proposition contains an entailment, which requires further explanation, whereas in the second case the latter proposition is, arguably, explanatorily basic: there is nothing to be said to explain why "this A is a B" besides the fact that this A is a B. could not be conceived to be distinct, it still would reverse the order of nature to conclude on this basis that those substances cannot be distinct. Wittich would not bother to make this argument, however, since, as the above quotation shows, he believes that substances in such a case can be conceived as distinct, and indeed often are. 36. Wittichius, Anti-Spinoza, 49: "Quando ergo substantia dicitur esse in se & per se, intelligitur sic esse in cogitatione, in intellectu, hoc est, nos per substantiam tale quid intelligere quod an existat nec ne ex hoc nostro conceptu non possumus determinare, quemadmodum, si quis dicat, totum est id quod componitur ex omnibus suis partibus non licet inde inferre: Ergo existit totum, quia dum sic esse tribuimus toti, id tantum intelligendum est de nostro intellectu, quod scilicet sic totum sit in nostro intellectu. Talem veram h.e. claram & distinctam ideam habemus de substantia, non tamen possumus propterea dicere, quod substantia talis existat. Sic habemus ideam claram & distinctam de Angelo, quod sit mens separata à corpore, nec tamen ex illa ipsa idea licet colligere, quod Angelus existat." 37. Hubert gives the impression that other early critics of Spinoza also took the word "substance" to describe how a thing is being conceived, rather than simply the way it is. Dom François Lamy, for example, criticizes Spinoza for not realizing that "to say that a substance is conceived in itself is to
